Floggers in action (2)

Slogging-Match over Lebanon

Alter the chapter of the Yom Kippour/Ramadan War was closed by the cease-fire on the Golan front, in April 1974, there followed a lengthy lull in the seemingly constant war between Israel and Syria. That was until 1979-1980, when a new series of skirmishes developed, as the SyAAF tried to interfere with frequent Israeli recce and bombing missions against Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) positions in Lebanon. The SyAAF was relatively slow to introduce the MiG-23MS during the fighting over Lebanon, choosing instead to dispatch MiG-21s. However, this changed as their losses started to mount, and soon the Syrian Ground Controlled Interception (GCI was searching for a suitable target for which it could re-introduce the MiG-23MS to combat.
The first such event occurred on the afternoon of April 26, 1981, when an Israeli formation bombed the PLO position), in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon. Two MiG-23MSs on low orbit over northern Lebanon, were vectored to intercept, and successfully shot down two Douglas A-4 Skyhawks. As a result of this and several clashes, the situation over Lebanon became particularly tense, but for the time being, the Israelis were busy preparing their operation against the Iraqi nuclear reactor plant in Tuweitha, which were flown in June 1981. The next opportunity for the Syrian MiG-23MS to engage Israeli fighters came after the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon, with Operation PEACE FOR GALILEA, initiated on June 6, 1982.
Initially, the Israelis tried to avoid engaging with Syrians - the IDF/AF concentrating on supporting ground troops on their drive towards Beirut. However, the SyAAF was clearly not going to sit still and let Israeli armoured formations threaten to outflank Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley, or allow IDF/AF reconnaissance operations to get a clear picture of the Syrian SAM positions. Very soon after the Israeli operations began, the first Syrian interceptors appeared above Lebanon. While MlG-23MFs had successfully shot down an Israeli BQM-34 recce drone and evaded a section of four Israeli McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagles which fired numerous Sparrow air-to-air missiles against them on June 6, and also claimed to have shot down a General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon on the following day, the MiG-23MS interceptors were kept back and did not initially take part in any fighting.
Three days into the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the situation changed completely, as a clash with Syrian troop deployed in the Bekaa Valley and around Beirut became unavoidable. In order to establish air superiority over the battlefield, on the afternoon of June 9, 1982, starting at 14:14, the IDF/AF executed the well-known operation against SAM sites in eastern Lebanon, deploying 26 F-4Es to attack Syrian radars with AGM-78 Standard ARM/Purple Fist and AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles. Nineteen radar sites were claimed as destroyed or neutralised in the first wave.
In the following battles, caused by the appearance of the second Israeli wave, including 92 A-4 Skyhawks, F-4E Phantoms, and IAI Kfirs, escorted by F-15s and F-16s, both the Syrian SAM stations and no less than 54 Syrian MiG-21 and MiG-23 interceptors sent to stop them were left 'blind'. Without their radars inside Lebanon, the Syrians were compelled to guide their fighters using long-range systems positioned inside Syria, but hindered by the mountain ridges in between. Even these were jammed by the Israelis, just like the communications between Syrian pilots and their GCI-stations, while-guided by Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes - Israeli interceptors waited in ambush at low level between Lebanese hills. In the ensuing battle, several Syrian MiG-21 squadrons were mauled. Syrian MiG-23MS pilots played only a secondary role, and claimed only one Israeli F-4E Phantom as shot down by R-3S missiles fired by two Floggers, while two of them were also shot down, with the loss of one pilot, Lt Sofi. In contrast, Syrian MiG-23MF pilots claimed three kills, for three losses, with all pilots ejecting safely. "...THE AIR-TO-AIR BATTLES FOUGHT OVER LEBANON WERE SOME OF THE LARGEST EVER INVOLVING JET FIGHTERS..."

Between June 9 and 11, 1982, the air-to-air battles fought over Lebanon were some of the largest ever involving jet fighters, as subsequently the SyAAF started to fly air-to-ground mission as well. Initially a squadron-sized attack force, escorted by at least a squadron of interceptors, was dispatched, with the interceptor pilots being ordered to do their utmost to keep Israeli interceptors at bay. 'Colonel H', a decorated MiG-23 pilot who new 13 combat missions over Lebanon in June 1982, explained the situation:
We were continuously pushed into pursuing the enemy by the ground control, although we were not in the best situations. The enemy used this to advantage and set up numerous ambushes where some fighters would drag us into the shooting zone of the others. When closed to 10-15 km to the enemy, our radars would go black and we would lose all means of detecting them. Heavy jamming wasn't concentrated on our radars alone, but also on our communications with ground control.
Still there where ways to trick that situation. One was for many formations to ingree simultaneously, or in waves one closely behind the other. This way the later waves would still have the abilitu to use their radar and fire at the enemy while they were busy engaging the first wave. This tactic, however, proved very expensive, and always led to losses on our side.
Many of our pilots were not experienced; they always obeyed any order by the GCI, and this led many of them to death. I followed the advice from an older pilot not to always do what i'm told to do, and this saved me. I used a tactic which depended on making the enemy angry. I followed the advice from an older pilot not to always do what I'm told to do, and this saved me. I used a tactic which depended on making the enemy angry. I would close at high speed, but before entering the range of their Sparrows, I'd turn away and then do that again and again, until they would start to fire their missiles even outside the maximum range. I once evaded four Sparrows this way. only then would i try to close into the range of my missiles, usually causing them to turn away and try to avoid. That way my mission was done and my bombers were safe to attack.
On June 10, SyAAF MiG-23MSs are not known to have flown the case with the MiG-23MFs as well. After the first two days of massive air-to-air battles, it became clear to the Syrians, that well placed Israeli fighters had managed to tear Syrian bomber-formation escort apart. In some cases, the situation was so bad, that the best the Syrian pilots could do was to drag Israelis into SAM traps, as "Colonel H", explained: "I DEVELOPED MY TACTICS A LITTLE MORE...
THE SECOND TIME AN EAGLE GOT HIT AND I WAS TOLD IT WAS SHOT DOWN.
I GOT MANY PRAISES FOR THAT."

During my last missions, I developed my tactics a little more. I managed twice to lure enemy F-15s into SAM ambushes. First time they were not hit, but the second time an Eagle got hit and I was told it was shot down. I got many praises for that.
On June 11, the SyAAF changed its tactics once again, dispatching two huge formations - each consisting of a squadron-worth of fighter-bombers escorted by another squadron of interceptors. Several times, MiG-25s were also deployed at high speeds and levels, decoying the Israelis away from the strikers following at low levels. At least, this changed the situation in so that the Syrian interceptors kept the Israeli fighters busy, and, even if the first attack wave had to abort the mission, or suffer losses to Israelis, the second wave following closely behind would usually be able to take advantage of the complete chaos.
Apparently, this tactic enabled at least two larger Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter formations to break through and hit an Israeli MIM- 23 Hawk SAM site, as well as cause extensive damage to one of the armoured brigades battling the Syrian 3rd Armoured Division near the Beirut-Damascus road. During a melee in which F-15s and F-16s of the IDF/AF and Israeli SAMs claimed between five and seven Su-22s shot down, two MIG-23MS pilots apparently used the chaos to break away and surprise an ingressing Israeli formation. Captain Abdul Wahhab al-Kherat and one of the pilots from the al-Zoa'by family, claimed one F-4E each as shot down using R-3S missiles. According to Syrian sources, both pilots were subsequently shot down by Israeli F-15s, but they ejected safely and walked back to Syrian positions.
Another former SyAAF pilot, 'Captain D', later explained:
Without dispute, we made many mistakes in 1982, and many of our younger and less experienced pilots paid for these with their lives. Hut the Israelis were never in full control of the skies over Lebanon, and many Syrian pilots managed to dictate the rules of the battle. Heavy jamming and good planning applied by the other side caused us many problems, but the SyAAF was neither completely destroyed, nor neutralised, and it remained active right until the ceasefire at noon on June 11.
In total, during the fighting over Lebanon, between April 1981 and June 1982, SyAAF MiG-23MS interceptors claimed two kills and suffered a loss of four aircraft and one pilot. According to Syrian sources, the SyAAF lost 85 aircraft between June 6 and 11, 1982, together with 27 pilots killed and eight injured, in exchange for 21 Israeli aircraft and helicopters. Israeli sources deny any losses in air combat, while their published air-to-air claims vary between 82 and 87. F-15s and F-16s of the IDF/AF and Israeli SAMs claimed between five and seven Su-22s shot down, two MIG-23MS pilots apparently used the chaos to break away and surprise an ingressing Israeli formation. Captain Abdul Wahhab al-Kherat and one of the pilots from the al-Zoa'by family, claimed one F-4E each as shot down using R-3S missiles. According to Syrian sources, both pilots were subsequently shot down by Israeli F-15s, but they ejected safely and walked back to Syrian positions. Another former SyAAF pilot, 'Captain D', later explained: Without dispute, we made many mistakes in 1982, and many of our younger and less experienced pilots paid for these with their lives. Hut the Israelis were never in full control of the skies over Lebanon, and many Syrian pilots managed to dictate the rules of the battle. Heavy jamming and good planning applied by the other side caused us many problems, but the SyAAF was neither completely destroyed, nor neutralised, and it remained active right until the ceasefire at noon on June 11. In total, during the fighting over Lebanon, between April 1981 and June 1982, SyAAF MiG-23MS interceptors claimed two kills and suffered a loss of four aircraft and one pilot. According to Syrian sources, the SyAAF lost 85 aircraft between June 6 and 11, 1982, together with 27 pilots killed and eight injured, in exchange for 21 Israeli aircraft and helicopters. Israeli sources deny any losses in air combat, while their published air-to-air claims vary between 82 and 87. next